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Abstract—Evidence indicates that downloading on-demand
videos accounts for a dramatic increase in data traffic over
cellular networks. Caching popular videos in the storage of
small-cell base stations (SBS), namely, small-cell caching, is an
efficient technology for reducing the transmission latency whilst
mitigating the redundant transmissions of popular videos over
back-haul channels. In this paper, we consider a commercialized
small-cell caching system consisting of a network service provider
(NSP), several video retailers (VR), and mobile users (MU). The
NSP leases its SBSs to the VRs for the purpose of making
profits, and the VRs, after storing popular videos in the rented
SBSs, can provide faster local video transmissions to the MUs,
thereby gaining more profits. We conceive this system within
the framework of Stackelberg game by treating the SBSs as a
specific type of resources. We first model the MUs and SBSs
as two independent Poisson point processes, and develop, via
stochastic geometry theory, the probability of the specific event
that an MU obtains the video of its choice directly from the
memory of an SBS. Then, based on the probability derived, we
formulate a Stackelberg game to jointly maximize the average
profit of both the NSP and the VRs. Also, we investigate the
Stackelberg equilibrium by solving a non-convex optimization
problem. With the aid of this game theoretic framework, we
shed light on the relationship between four important factors: the
optimal pricing of leasing an SBS, the SBSs allocation among the
VRs, the storage size of the SBSs, and the popularity distribution
of the VRs. Monte-Carlo simulations show that our stochastic
geometry-based analytical results closely match the empirical
ones. Numerical results are also provided for quantifying the
proposed game-theoretic framework by showing its efficiency on
pricing and resource allocation.
Index Terms—Small-cell caching, cellular networks, stochastic
geometry, Stackelberg game
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless data traffic is expected to increase exponentially
in the next few years driven by a staggering proliferation
of mobile users (MU) and their bandwidth-hungry mobile
applications. There is evidence that streaming of on-demand
videos by the MUs is the major reason for boosting the tele-
traffic over cellular networks [1]. According to the prediction
of mobile data traffic by Cisco, mobile video streaming will
account for 72% of the overall mobile data traffic by 2019.
The on-demand video downloading involves repeated wireless
transmission of videos that are requested multiple times by
different users in a completely asynchronous manner, which
is different from the transmission style of live video streaming.
Often, there are numerous repetitive requests of popular
videos from the MUs, such as online blockbusters, leading
to redundant video transmissions. The redundancy of data
transmissions can be reduced by locally storing popular videos,
known as caching, into the storage of intermediate network
nodes, effectively forming a local caching system [1, 2]. The
local caching brings video content closer to the MUs and
alleviates redundant data transmissions via redirecting the
downloading requests to the intermediate nodes.
Generally, wireless data caching consists of two stages: data
placement and data delivery [3]. In the data placement stage,
popular videos are cached into local storages during off-peak
periods, while during the data delivery stage, videos requested
are delivered from the local caching system to the MUs.
Recent works advanced the caching solutions of both device-
to-device (D2D) networks and wireless sensor networks [4–
6]. Specifically, in [4] a caching scheme was proposed for a
D2D based cellular network relaying on the MUs’ caching
of popular video content. In this scheme, the D2D cluster
size was optimized for reducing the downloading delay. In [5,
6], the authors proposed novel caching schemes for wireless
sensor networks, where the protocol model of [7] was adopted.
Since small-cell embedded architectures will dominate in
future cellular networks, known as heterogeneous networks
(HetNet) [8–13], caching relying on small-cell base stations
(SBS), namely, small-cell caching, constitutes a promising so-
lution for HetNets. The advantages brought about by small-cell
caching are threefold. Firstly, popular videos are placed closer
to the MUs when they are cached in SBSs, hence reducing the
transmission latency. Secondly, redundant transmissions over
SBSs’ back-haul channels, which are usually expensive [14],
can be mitigated. Thirdly, the majority of video traffic is
offloaded from macro-cell base stations to SBSs.
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In [15], a small-cell caching scheme, named ‘Femto-
caching’, is proposed for a cellular network having embedded
SBSs, where the data placement at the SBSs is optimized in a
centralized manner for the sake of reducing the transmission
delay imposed. However, [15] considers an idealized system,
where neither the interference nor the impact of wireless
channels is taken into account. The associations between the
MUs and the SBSs are pre-determined without considering
the specific channel conditions encountered. In [16], small-
cell caching is investigated in the context of stochastic net-
works. The average performance is quantified with the aid of
stochastic geometry [17, 18], where the distribution of network
nodes is modeled by Poisson point process (PPP). However,
the caching strategy of [16] assumes that the SBSs cache the
same content, hence leading to a sub-optimal solution.
As detailed above, current research on wireless caching
mainly considers the data placement issue optimized for reduc-
ing the downloading delay. However, the entire caching system
design involves numerous issues apart from data placement.
From a commercial perspective, it will be more interesting to
consider the topics of pricing for video streaming, the rental
of local storage, and so on. A commercialized caching system
may consist of video retailers (VR), network service providers
(NSP) and MUs. The VRs, e.g., Youtube, purchase copyrights
from video producers and publish the videos on their web-
sites. The NSPs are typically operators of cellular networks,
who are in charge of network facilities, such as macro-cell
base stations and SBSs.
In such a commercial small-cell caching system, the VRs’
revenue is acquired from providing video streaming for the
MUs. As the central servers of the VRs, which store the pop-
ular videos, are usually located in the backbone networks and
far away from the MUs, an efficient solution is to locally cache
these videos, thereby gaining more profits from providing
faster local transmissions. In turn, these local caching demands
raised by the VRs offer the NSPs profitable opportunities from
leasing their SBSs. Additionally, the NSPs can save consid-
erable costs due to reduced redundant video transmissions
over SBSs’ back-haul channels. In this sense, both the VRs
and NSPs are the beneficiaries of the local caching system.
However, each entity is selfish and wishes to maximize its
own benefit, raising a competition and optimization problem
among these entities, which can be effectively solved within
the framework of game theory.
We note that game theory has been successfully applied
to wireless communications for solving resource allocation
problems. In [19], the authors propose a dynamic spectrum
leasing mechanism via power control games. In [20], a price-
based power allocation scheme is proposed for spectrum
sharing in Femto-cell networks based on Stackelberg game.
Game theoretical power control strategies for maximizing the
utility in spectrum sharing networks are studied in [21, 22].
In this paper, we propose a commercial small-cell caching
system consisting of an NSP, multiple VRs and MUs. We
optimize such a system within the framework of Stackelberg
game by viewing the SBSs as a specific type of resources for
the purpose of video caching. Generally speaking, Stackelberg
game is a strategic game that consists of a leader and several
followers competing with each other for certain resources [23].
The leader moves first and the followers move subsequently.
Correspondingly, in our game theoretic caching system, we
consider the NSP to be the leader and the VRs as the followers.
The NSP sets the price of leasing an SBS, while the VRs
compete with each other for renting a fraction of the SBSs.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, our work is the first
of its kind that optimizes a caching system with the aid of
game theory. Compared to many other game theory based
resource allocation schemes, where the power, bandwidth and
time slots are treated as the resources, our work has a totally
different profit model, established based on our coverage
derivations. In particular, our contributions are as follows.
1) By following the stochastic geometry framework of [17,
18], we model the MUs and SBSs in the network as
two different ties of a Poisson point process (PPP) [24].
Under this network model, we define the concept of
a successful video downloading event when an MU
obtains the requested video directly from the storage of
an SBS. Then we quantify the probability of this event
based on stochastic geometry theory.
2) Based on the probability derived, we develop a profit
model of our caching system and formulate the profits
gained by the NSP and the VRs from SBSs leasing and
renting.
3) A Stackelberg game is proposed for jointly maximizing
the average profit of the NSP and the VRs. Given this
game theoretic framework, we investigate a non-uniform
pricing scheme, where the price charged to different VRs
varies.
4) Then we investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium of this
scheme via solving a non-convex optimization problem.
It is interesting to observe that the optimal solution is
related both to the storage size of each SBS and to the
popularity distribution of the VRs.
5) Furthermore, we consider an uniform pricing scheme.
We find that although the uniform pricing scheme is
inferior to the non-uniform one in terms of maximizing
the NSP’s profit, it is capable of reducing more back-
haul costs compared with the latter and achieves the
maximum sum profit of the NSP and the VRs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe
the system model in Section II and establish the related
profit model in Section III. We then formulate Stackelberg
game for our small-cell caching system in Section IV. In
Section V, we investigate Stackelberg equilibrium for the non-
uniform pricing scheme by solving a non-convex optimization
problem, while in Section VI, we further consider the uniform
pricing scheme. Our simulations and numerical results are
detailed in Section VII, while our conclusions are provided
in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a commercial small-cell caching system con-
sisting of an NSP, V VRs, and a number of MUs. Let us
denote by L the NSP, by V = {V1,V2, · · · ,VV } the set of
the VRs, and byM one of the MUs. Fig. 1 shows an example
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Fig. 1. An example of the small-cell caching system with four VRs.
of our caching system relying on four VRs. In such a system,
the VRs wish to rent the SBSs from L for placing their videos.
Both the NSP and each VR aim for maximizing their profits.
There are three stages in our system. In the first stage, the
VRs purchase the copyrights of popular videos from video
producers and publish them on their web-sites. In the second
stage, the VRs negotiate with the NSP on the rent of SBSs
for caching these popular videos. In the third stage, the MUs
connect to the SBSs for downloading the desired videos. We
will particulary focus our attention on the second and third
stages within this game theoretic framework.
A. Network Model
Let us consider a small-cell based caching network com-
posed of the MUs and the SBSs owned by L, where each
SBS is deployed with a fixed transmit power P and the storage
of Q video files. Let us assume that the SBSs transmit over
the channels that are orthogonal to those of the macro-cell
base stations, and thus there is no interference incurred by the
macro-cell base stations. Also, assume that these SBSs are
spatially distributed according to a homogeneous PPP (HPPP)
Φ of intensity λ. Here, the intensity λ represents the number of
the SBSs per unit area. Furthermore, we model the distribution
of the MUs as an independent HPPP Ψ of intensity ζ.
The wireless down-link channels spanning from the SBSs
to the MUs are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.),
and modeled as the combination of path-loss and Rayleigh
fading. Without loss of generality, we carry out our analysis
for a typical MU located at the origin. The path-loss between
an SBS located at x and the typical MU is denoted by ‖x‖−α,
where α is the path-loss exponent. The channel power of the
Rayleigh fading between them is denoted by hx, where hx ∼
exp(1). The noise at an MU is Gaussian distributed with a
variance σ2.
We consider the steady-state of a saturated network, where
all the SBSs keep on transmitting data in the entire frequency
band allocated. This modeling approach for saturated networks
characterizes the worst-case scenario of the real systems,
which has been adopted by numerous studies on PPP analysis,
such as [18]. Hence, the received signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) at the typical MU from an SBS located at
x can be expressed as
ρ(x) =
Phx‖x‖−α∑
x′∈Φ\x Phx′‖x′‖−α + σ2
. (1)
The typical MU is considered to be “covered” by an SBS
located at x as long as ρ(x) is no lower than a pre-set SINR
threshold δ, i.e.,
ρ(x) ≥ δ. (2)
Generally, an MU can be covered by multiple SBSs. Note that
the SINR threshold δ defines the highest delay of downloading
a video file. Since the quality and code rate of a video clip
have been specified within the video file, the download delay
will be the major factor predetermining the QoS perceived by
the mobile users. Therefore, we focus our attention on the
coverage and SINR in the following derivations.
B. Popularity and Preferences
We now model the popularity distribution, i.e., the distri-
bution of request probabilities, among the popular videos to
be cached. Let us denote by F = {F1,F2, · · · ,FN} the file
set consisting of N video files, where each video file contains
an individual movie or video clip that is frequently requested
by MUs. The popularity distribution of F is represented by a
vector t = [t1, t2, · · · , tN ]. That is, the MUs make independent
requests of the n-th video Fn, n = 1, · · · , N , with the
probability of tn. Generally, t can be modeled by the Zipf
distribution [25] as
tn =
1/nβ∑N
j=1 1/j
β
, ∀n, (3)
where the exponent β is a positive value, characterizing the
video popularity. A higher β corresponds to a higher content
reuse, where the most popular files account for the majority
of download requests. From Eq. (3), the file with a smaller n
corresponds to a higher popularity.
Note that each SBS can cache at most Q video files, and
usually Q is no higher than the number of videos in F , i.e., we
have Q ≤ N . Without loss of generality, we assume that N/Q
is an integer. The N files in F are divided into F = N/Q file
groups (FG), with each FG containing Q video files. The n-th
video, ∀n ∈ {(f − 1)Q+ 1, · · · , fQ}, is included in the f -th
FG, f = 1, · · · , F . Denote by Gf the f -th FG, and by pf the
probability of the MUs’ requesting a file in Gf , and we have
pf =
fQ∑
n=(f−1)Q+1
tn, ∀f. (4)
File caching is then carried out on the basis of FGs, where
each SBS caches one of the F FGs.
At the same time, the MUs have unbalanced preferences
with regard to the V VRs, i.e., some VRs are more popular
than others. For example, the majority of the MUs may tend to
access Youtube for video streaming. The preference distribu-
tion among the VRs is denoted by q = [q1, q2, · · · , qV ], where
qv , v = 1, · · · , V , represents the probability that the MUs
prefer to download videos from Vv . The preference distribution
q can also be modeled by the Zipf distribution. Hence, we have
qv =
1/vγ∑V
j=1 1/j
γ
, ∀v, (5)
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where γ is a positive value, characterizing the preference of
the VRs. A higher γ corresponds to a higher probability of
accessing the most popular VRs.
C. Video Placement and Download
Next, we introduce the small-cell caching system with its
detailed parameters. In the first stage, each VR purchases the
N popular videos in F from the producers and publishes these
videos on its web-site. In the second stage, upon obtaining
these videos, the VRs negotiate with the NSP L for renting
its SBSs. As L leases its SBSs to multiple VRs, we denote by
τ = [τ1, τ2, · · · , τV ] the fraction vector, where τv represents
the fraction of the SBSs that are assigned to Vv , ∀v. We assume
that the SBSs rented by each VR are uniformly distributed.
Hence, the SBSs that are allocated to Vv can be modeled as
a “thinned” HPPP Φv with intensity τvλ.
The data placements of the second stage commence during
network off-peak time after the VRs obtain access to the SBSs.
During the placements, each SBS will be allocated with one
of the F FGs. Generally, we assume that the VRs do not have
the a priori information regarding the popularity distribution
of F . This is because the popularity of videos is changing
periodically, and can only be obtained statistically after these
videos quit the market. It is clear that each VR may have
more or less some statistical information on the popularity
distribution of videos based on the MUs’ downloading history.
However, this information will be biased due to limited
sampling. In this case, the VRs will uniformly assign the F
FGs to the SBSs with equal probability of 1F for simplicity. We
are interested in investigating the uniform assignment of video
files for drawing a bottom line of the system performance. As
the FGs are randomly assigned, the SBSs in Φv that cache
the FG Gf can be further modeled as a “more thinned” HPPP
Φv,f with an intensity of 1F τvλ.
In the third stage, the MUs start to download videos. When
an MU M requires a video of Gf from Vv , it searches the
SBSs in Φv,f and tries to connect to the nearest SBS that
covers M. Provided that such an SBS exists, the MU M
will obtain this video directly from this SBS, and we thereby
define this event by Ev,f . By contrast, if such an SBS does
not exist, M will be redirected to the central servers of Vv
for downloading the requested file. Since the servers of Vv
are located at the backbone network, this redirection of the
demand will trigger a transmission via the back-haul channels
of the NSP L, hence leading to an extra cost.
III. PROFIT MODELING
We now focus on modeling the profit of the NSP and
the VRs obtained from the small-cell caching system. The
average profit is developed based on stochastically geometrical
distributions of the network nodes in terms of per unit area
times unit period (/UAP ), e.g., /month · km2.
A. Average Profit of the NSP
For the NSP L, the revenue gained from the caching system
consists of two parts: 1) the income gleaned from leasing SBSs
to the VRs and 2) the cost reduction due to reduced usage of
the SBSs’ back-haul channels. First, the leasing income/UAP
of L can be calculated as
SRT =
V∑
j=1
τjλsj , (6)
where sj is the price per unit period charged to Vj for
renting an SBS. Then we formulate the saved cost/UAP due
to reduced back-haul channel transmissions. When an MU
demands a video in Gf from Vv , we derive the probability
Pr(Ev,f ) as follows.
Theorem 1: The probability of the event Ev,f , ∀v, f , can be
expressed as
Pr(Ev,f ) = τv
C(δ, α)(F − τv) + A(δ, α)τv + τv , (7)
where we have A(δ, α) , 2δα−2 2F1
(
1, 1− 2α ; 2− 2α ;−δ
)
and C(δ, α) , 2αδ
2
αB
(
2
α , 1− 2α
)
. Furthermore, 2F1(·) in
the function A(δ, α) is the hypergeometric function, while
the Beta function in C(δ, α) is formulated as B(x, y) =∫ 1
0
tx−1(1− t)y−1dt.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. 
Remark 1: From Theorem 1, it is interesting to observe that
the probability Pr(Ev,f ) is independent of both the transmit
power P and the intensity λ of the SBSs. Furthermore, since
Q is inversely proportional to F , we can enhance Pr(Ev,f ) by
increasing the storage size Q.
We assume that there are on average K video requests from
each MU within unit period, and that the average back-haul
cost for a video transmission is sbh. Based on Pr(Ev,f ) in
Eq. (7), we obtain the cost reduction/UAP for the back-haul
channels of L as
SBH =
F∑
j1=1
V∑
j2=1
pj1qj2ζK Pr(Ej2,j1)sbh. (8)
By combining the above two items, the overall profit/UAP
for L can be expressed as
SNSP = SRT + SBH . (9)
B. Average Profit of the VRs
Note that the MUs can download the videos either from the
memories of the SBSs directly or from the servers of the VRs
at backbone networks via back-haul channels. In the first case,
the MUs will be levied by the VRs an extra amount of money
in addition to the videos’ prices because of the higher-rate
local streaming, namely, local downloading surcharge (LDS).
We assume that the LDS of each video is set as sld. Then
the revenue/UAP for a VR Vv gained from the LDS can be
calculated as
SLDv =
F∑
j=1
pjqvζK Pr(Ev,j)sld. (10)
Additionally, Vv pays for renting the SBSs from L. The related
cost/UAP can be written as
SRTv = τvλsv. (11)
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Upon combining the two items, the profit/UAP for Vv , ∀v,
can be expressed as
SV Rv = S
LD
v − SRTv . (12)
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first present the Stackelberg game for-
mulation for our price-based SBS allocation scheme. Then the
equilibrium of the proposed game is investigated.
A. Stackelberg Game Formulation
Again, Stackelberg game is a strategic game that consists of
a leader and several followers competing with each other for
certain resources [23]. The leader moves first and the followers
move subsequently. In our small-cell caching system, we
model the NSP L as the leader, and the V VRs as the fol-
lowers. The NSP imposes a price vector s = [s1, s2, · · · , sV ]
for the lease of its SBSs, where sv , ∀v, has been defined in
the previous section as the price per unit period charged on
Vv for renting an SBS. After the price vector s is set, the VRs
update the fraction τv , ∀v, that they tend to rent from L.
1) Optimization Formulation of the Leader: Observe from
the above game model that the NSP’s objective is to maximize
its profit SNSP formulated in Eq. (9). Note that for ∀v, the
fraction τv is a function of the price sv under the Stackelberg
game formulation. This means that the fraction of the SBSs
that each VR is willing to rent depends on the specific price
charged to them for renting an SBS. Consequently, the NSP
has to find the optimal price vector s for maximizing its profit.
This optimization problem can be summarized as follows.
Problem 1: The optimization problem of maximizing L’s
profit can be formulated as
max
s0
SNSP (s, τ ),
s.t.
V∑
j=1
τj ≤ 1.
(13)
2) Optimization Formulation of the Followers: The profit
gained by the VR Vv in Eq. (12) can be further written as
SV Rv (τv, sv) =
F∑
j=1
pjqvζK Pr(Ev,j)sld − τvλsv
=
F∑
j=1
pjqvζKs
ldτv
(A(δ, α)− C(δ, α) + 1)τv + C(δ, α)F − λsvτv.
(14)
We can see from Eq. (14) that once the price sv is fixed,
the profit of Vv depends on τv , i.e., the fraction of SBSs that
are rented by Vv . If Vv increases the fraction τv , it will gain
more revenue by levying surcharges from more MUs, while
at the same time, Vv will have to pay for renting more SBSs.
Therefore, τv has to be optimized for maximizing the profit
of Vv . This optimization can be formulated as follows.
Problem 2: The optimization problem of maximizing Vv’s
profit can be written as
max
τv≥0
SV Rv (τv, sv). (15)
Problem 1 and Problem 2 together form a Stackelberg
game. The objective of this game is to find the Stackelberg
Equilibrium (SE) points from which neither the leader (NSP)
nor the followers (VRs) have incentives to deviate. In the
following, we investigate the SE points for the proposed game.
B. Stackelberg Equilibrium
For our Stackelberg game, the SE is defined as follows.
Definition 1: Let s? , [s?1, s?2, · · · , s?V ] be a solution for
Problem 1, and τ?v be a solution for Problem 2, ∀v. Define
τ ? , [τ?1 , τ?2 , · · · , τ?V ]. Then the point (s?, τ ?) is an SE for
the proposed Stackelberg game if for any (s, τ ) with s  0
and τ  0, the following conditions are satisfied:
SNSP (s?, τ ?) ≥ SNSP (s, τ ?),
SV Rv (s
?
v, τ
?
v ) ≥ SV Rv (s?v, τv), ∀v.
(16)
Generally speaking, the SE of a Stackelberg game can be
obtained by finding its perfect Nash Equilibrium (NE). In our
proposed game, we can see that the VRs strictly compete
in a non-cooperative fashion. Therefore, a non-cooperative
subgame on controlling the fractions of rented SBSs is for-
mulated at the VRs’ side. For a non-cooperative game, the
NE is defined as the operating points at which no players can
improve utility by changing its strategy unilaterally. At the
NSP’s side, since there is only one player, the best response
of the NSP is to solve Problem 1. To achieve this, we need to
first find the best response functions of the followers, based
on which, we solve the best response function for the leader.
Therefore, in our game, we first solve Problem 2 given a
price vector s. Then with the obtained best response function
τ ? of the VRs, we solve Problem 1 for the optimal price s?.
In the following, we will have an in-depth investigation on
this game theoretic optimization.
V. GAME THEORETIC OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we will solve the optimization problem in
our game under the non-uniform pricing scheme, where the
NSP L charges the VRs with different prices s1, · · · , sV for
renting an SBS. In this scheme, we first solve Problem 2 at
the VRs, and rewrite Eq. (14) as
SV Rv (τv, sv) =
Γvs
ldτv
Θτv + Λ
− λsvτv.0 (17)
where Γv ,
∑F
j=1 pjqvζK, Θ , A(δ, α) − C(δ, α) + 1, and
Λ , C(δ, α)F . We observe that Eq. (17) is a concave function
over the variable τv . Thus, we can obtain the optimal solution
by solving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, and we
have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: For a given price sv , the optimal solution of
Problem 2 is
τ?v =
(√
ΓvΛsld
Θ2λ
√
1
sv
− Λ
Θ
)+
, (18)
where (·)+ , max(·, 0).
Proof: The optimal solution τ?v of Vv can be obtained by
deriving SV Rv with respect to τv and solving
dSVRv
dτv
= 0 under
the constraint that τv ≥ 0. 
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We can see from Lemma 1 that if the price sv is set too
high, i.e., sv ≥ ΓvsldΛλ , the VR Vv will opt out for renting any
SBS from L due the high price charged. Consequently, the
VR Vv will not participate in the game.
In the following derivations, we assume that the LDS on
each video sld is set by the VRs to be the cost of a video trans-
mission via back-haul channels sbh. The rational behind this
assumption is as follows. Since a local downloading reduce a
back-haul transmission, this saved back-haul transmission can
be potentially utilized to provide extra services (equivalent to
the value of sbh) for the MUs. In addition, the MUs enjoy the
benefit from faster local video transmissions. In light of this,
it is reasonable to assume that the MUs are willing to accept
the price sbh for a local video transmission.
Substituting the optimal τ?v of Eq. (18) into Eq. (9) and
carry out some further manipulations, we arrive at
SNSP =
V∑
j=1
λsj
(√
ΓjΛsbh
Θ2λ
√
1
sj
− Λ
Θ
)+
+
∑F
i=1 piqjζKs
bh
(√
ΓjΛsbh
Θ2λ
√
1
sj
− ΛΘ
)+
Θ
(√
ΓjΛsbh
Θ2λ
√
1
sj
− ΛΘ
)+
+ Λ
=
V∑
j=1
ξi
Θ
(
−Λλsj +
(√
sbh − s
bh
√
sbh
)√
ΓjΛλsj + Γjs
bh
)
=
V∑
j=1
ξi
Θ
(−Λλsj + Γjsbh) , (19)
where ξj is the indicator function, with ξj = 1 if sj <
Γjs
bh
Λλ
and ξj = 0 otherwise. Upon defining the binary vector ξ ,
[ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξV ], we can rewrite Problem 1 as follows.
Problem 3: Given the optimal solutions τ?v , ∀v, gleaned
from the followers, we can rewrite Problem 1 as
min
ξ, s0
V∑
j=1
ξj
(
Λλsj − Γjsbh
)
,
s.t.
V∑
j=1
ξj
(√
ΓjΛsbh
λsj
− Λ
)
≤ Θ.
(20)
Observe from Eq. (20) that Problem 3 is non-convex due
to ξ. However, for a given ξ, this problem can be solved by
satisfying the KKT conditions. In the following, we commence
with the assumption that ξ = 1, i.e., ξv = 1, ∀v, and then we
extend this result to the general case.
A. Special Case: ξv = 1, ∀v
In this case, all the VRs are participating in the game, and
we have the following optimization problem.
Problem 4: Assuming ξv = 1, ∀v, we rewrite Problem 3 as
min
s0
V∑
j=1
sj ,
s.t.
V∑
j=1
√
Γj
sj
≤ (V Λ + Θ)
√
λ
Λsbh
.
(21)
The optimal solution of Problem 4 is derived and given in
the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The optimal solution to Problem 4 can be de-
rived as sˆ , [sˆ1, · · · , sˆV ], where
sˆv =
Λsbh
(∑V
j=1
3
√
Γj
)2
3
√
Γv
λ(V Λ + Θ)2
,∀v. (22)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B. 
Note that the solution given in Lemma 2 is found under
the assumption that ξv = 1, ∀v. That is, sˆv given in Eq. (22)
should ensure that τ?v > 0, ∀v, in Eq. (18), i.e.,
Λsbh
(∑V
j=1
3
√
Γj
)2
3
√
Γv
λ(V Λ + Θ)2
<
Γvs
bh
Λλ
. (23)
Given the definitions of Γv , Λ, and Θ, it is interesting to find
that the inequality (23) can be finally converted to a constraint
on the storage size Q of each SBS, which is formulated as
Q > max
NC(δ, α)
(∑V
j=1
3
√
qj
qv
− V
)
A(δ, α)− C(δ, α) + 1 , ∀v
 . (24)
The constraint imposed on Q can be expressed in a concise
manner in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: To make sure that sˆv in Eq. (22) does become
the optimal solution of Problem 4 when ξv = 1, ∀v, the
sufficient and necessary condition to be satisfied is
Q > Qmin ,
NC(δ, α)
(∑V
j=1
3
√
qj
qV
− V
)
A(δ, α)− C(δ, α) + 1 , (25)
where qV is the minimum value in q according to Eq. (5).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C. 
Remark 2: Observe from Eq. (25) that since qjqV increases
exponentially with γ according to Eq. (5), the value of Qmin
ensuring ξv = 1, ∀v, will increase exponentially with γ/3.
Note that we have Q ≤ N . In the case that Qmin in Eq. (25)
is larger than N for a high VR popularity exponent γ, some
VRs with the least popularity will be excluded from the game.
B. Further Discussion on Q
We define a series of variables Uv , ∀v, as follows:
Uv ,
NC(δ, α)
(∑v
j=1
3
√
qj
qv
− v
)
A(δ, α)− C(δ, α) + 1 , (26)
and formulate the following lemma.
Lemma 3: Uv is a strictly monotonically-increasing func-
tion of v, i.e., we have UV > UV−1 > · · · > U1.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D. 
For the special case of the previous subsection, the optimal
solution for ξv = 1, ∀v, is found under the condition that
the storage size obeys Q > UV . In other words, Q should be
large enough such that every VR can participate in the game.
However, when Q reduces, some VRs have to leave the game
as a result of the increased competition. Then we have the
following lemma.
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Lemma 4: When Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1, the NSP can only retain
at most the v VRs of V1,V2, · · · ,Vv in the game for achieving
its optimal solution.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix E. 
From Lemma 4, when we have Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1, and given
that there are u VRs, u ≤ v, in the game, we can have an
optimal solution for s.
Problem 5: when Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1 is satisfied, and given
that there are u, u ≤ v, VRs in the game, we can formulate
the following optimization problem as
min
s0
u∑
j=1
sj ,
s.t.
u∑
j=1
√
Γj
sj
≤ (uΛ + Θ)
√
λ
Λsbh
.
(27)
Similar to the solution of Problem 4, we arrive at
the optimal solution for the above problem as sˆu ,
[sˆ1,u, · · · , sˆi,u, · · · , sˆV,u], where
sˆi,u =
Λs
bh(
∑u
j=1
3
√
Γj)
2 3
√
Γi
λ(uΛ+Θ)2 , i = 1, · · · , u,
∞, i = u+ 1, · · · , V.
(28)
C. General Case
Let us now focus our attention on the general solution of
the original optimization problem, i.e., of Problem 3. Without
loss of generality, we consider the case of Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1.
Then Problem 3 is equivalent to the following problem.
Problem 6: When Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1, there are at most v
VRs in the game. Then Problem 3 can be converted to
min
ξ, s0
v∑
j=1
ξj
(
Λλsj − Γjsbh
)
,
s.t.
v∑
j=1
ξj
(√
ΓjΛsbh
λsj
− Λ
)
≤ Θ.
(29)
The problem in Eq. (29) is again non-convex due to the
uncertainty of ξu, u = 1, · · · , v. We have to consider the cases,
where there are u, ∀u, most popular VRs in the game. We
observe that for a given u, Problem 6 converts to Problem 5.
Therefore, to solve Problem 6, we first solve Problem 5 with a
given u and obtain sˆu according to Eq. (28). Then we choose
the optimal solution, denoted by s?v , among sˆ1, · · · , sˆv as the
solution to Problem 6, which is formulated as
s?v =
arg min
sˆu
min
 u∑
j=1
(
Λλsj − Γjsbh
) , u = 1, · · · , v
 .
(30)
Based on the above discussions, we can see that the optimal
solution s? of Problem 3 is a piece-wise function of Q, i.e.,
s? = s?v when Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1. Now, we formulate the
solution s? = [s?1, · · · , s?V ] to Problem 3 in a general manner
as follows.
s?v =
Λs
bh(
∑uˆ
j=1
3
√
Γj)
2 3
√
Γv
λ(uˆΛ+Θ)2 , v = 1, · · · , uˆ,
∞, v = uˆ+ 1, · · · , V,
(31)
where regarding uˆ, we have
uˆ = arg min
u
{Su : u = 1, 2, · · · , T}, (32)
with Su formulated as
Su =
u∑
j1=1
Λ2sbh
(∑u
j2=1
3
√
Γj2
)2
3
√
Γj1
(uΛ + Θ)2
− Γj1sbh
 ,
T =

1, U1 < Q ≤ U2,
· · · ,
v, Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1,
· · · ,
V, UV < Q.
(33)
To gain a better understanding of the optimal solution in
Eq. (31), we propose a centralized algorithm at L in Table I
for obtaining s?.
Remark 3: The optimal solution s? in Eq. (31), combined
with the solution of τ ? given by Eq. (18) in Lemma 1,
constitutes the SE for the Stackelberg game.
Algorithm 1 :
Input: Storage size Q, number of videos N , VRs’ preference distribution
q, channel exponent α, and pre-set threshold δ.
Output: Optimal pricing vector s?.
Steps:
1: Based on N , q, α, and δ, the NSP calculates Uv , ∀v, according to
Eq. (26);
2: By comparing Q to Uv , the NSP obtains the value of the integer T in
Eq. (33);
3: Calculate Su, u = 1, 2, · · · , T , according to Eq. (33);
4: Compare among S1, · · · , ST for finding the index uˆ of the minimum
Suˆ;
5: Based on uˆ, N , q, α, and δ, the NSP obtains the optimal solution s?
according to Eq. (31).
TABLE I
THE CENTRALIZED ALGORITHM AT THE NSP FOR OBTAINING THE
OPTIMAL SOLUTION S? .
Furthermore, by substituting the optimal s? into the expres-
sion of SNSP in Eq. (19), we get
SNSP (s?, τ ?) =
1
Θ
uˆ∑
j1=1
Γj1sbh − Λ2sbh
(∑uˆ
j2=1
3
√
Γj2
)2
3
√
Γj1
(uˆΛ + Θ)2
 . (34)
Remark 4: Since we have Γv ∝ qv , ∀v, and qv increases
exponentially with the VR preference parameter γ according
to Eq. (5), SNSP (s?, τ ?) also increases exponentially with γ.
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VI. DISCUSSIONS OF OTHER SCHEMES
Let us now consider two other schemes, namely, an uniform
pricing scheme and a global optimization scheme.
A. Uniform Pricing Scheme
In contrast to the non-uniform pricing scheme of the previ-
ous section, the uniform pricing scheme deliberately imposes
the same price on the VRs in the game. We denote the fixed
price by s. In this case, similar to Lemma 1, Problem 2 can
be solved by
τ?v =
(√
ΓvΛsbh
Θ2λ
√
1
s
− Λ
Θ
)+
. (35)
We first focus our attention on the special case of ξv = 1,
∀v. Then Problem 4 can be converted to that of minimizing s
subject to the constraint
∑V
j=1
√
Γj
s ≤ (V Λ + Θ)
√
λ
Λsbh
. We
then obtain the optimal sˆ for this special case as
sˆ =
Λsbh
(∑V
j=1
√
Γj
)2
λ(V Λ + Θ)2
. (36)
To guarantee that all the VRs are capable of participating in
the game, i.e., ξv = 1, ∀v, with the optimal price sˆ, we let
sˆ < Γvs
bh
Λλ . Then we have the following constraint on the
storage Q as
Q > Q′min ,
NC(δ, α)
(∑V
j=1
√
qj
qV
− V
)
A(δ, α)− C(δ, α) + 1 . (37)
We can see that the we require a larger storage size Q
in Eq. (37) than that in Eq. (25) under the non-uniform
pricing scheme to accommodate all the VRs, since we have∑V
j=1
√
qj
qV
>
∑V
j=1
3
√
qj
qV
. Following Remark 2, we con-
clude that Q′min of the uniform pricing scheme will increase
exponentially with γ/2.
Then based on this special case, the optimal s? =
[s?1, · · · , s?V ] in the uniform pricing scheme can be readily
obtained by following a similar method to that in the previous
section. That is,
s?v =
Λs
bh(
∑uˆ
j=1
√
Γj)
2
λ(uˆΛ+Θ)2 , v = 1, · · · , uˆ,
∞, v = uˆ+ 1, · · · , V,
(38)
where regarding uˆ, we have
uˆ = arg min
u
{Su : u = 1, 2, · · · , T}, (39)
with
Su =
uΛ2sbh
(∑u
j=1
√
Γj
)2
(uΛ + Θ)2
−
u∑
j=1
Γjs
bh,
T =

1, U¯1 < Q ≤ U¯2,
· · · ,
v, U¯v < Q ≤ U¯v+1,
· · · ,
V, U¯V < Q.
(40)
Note that U¯v in Eq. (40) is defined as
U¯v ,
NC(δ, α)
(∑v
j=1
√
qj
qv
− v
)
A(δ, α)− C(δ, α) + 1 . (41)
It is clear that the uniform pricing scheme is inferior
to the non-uniform pricing scheme in terms of maximizing
SNSP . However, we will show in the following problem that
the uniform pricing scheme offers the optimal solution to
maximizing the back-haul cost reduction SBH at the NSP in
conjunction with τ?v , ∀v, from the followers.
Problem 7: With the aid of the optimal solutions τ?v , ∀v,
from the followers, the maximization on SBH is achieved by
solving the following problem:
min
ξ, s0
V∑
j=1
ξj
(√
sbh
√
ΓjΛλ
√
sj − Γjsbh
)
,
s.t.
V∑
j=1
ξj
(√
ΓjΛsbh
λsj
− Λ
)
≤ Θ.
(42)
The optimal solution to Problem 7 can be readily shown
to be s? given in Eq. (38). This proof follows the similar
procedure of the optimization method presented in the pre-
vious section. Thus it is skipped for brevity. In this sense,
the uniform pricing scheme is superior to the non-uniform
scheme in terms of reducing more cost on back-haul channel
transmissions.
B. Global Optimization Scheme
In the global optimization scheme, we are interested in the
sum profit of the NSP and VRs, which can be expressed as
SGLB = SNSP +
V∑
j=1
SV Rj
=
V∑
j1=1
F∑
j2=1
2pj2qj1ζKs
bhτj1
(A(δ, α)− C(δ, α) + 1)τj1 + C(δ, α)F
= 2SBH .
(43)
Observe from Eq. (43), we can see that the sum profit SGLB
is twice the back-haul cost reduction SBH , where the vector
τ is the only variable of this maximization problem.
Problem 8: The optimization of the sum profit SGLB can
be formulated as
max
τ0
V∑
j1=1
τj1
∑F
j2=1
pj2qj1ζKs
bh
(A(δ, α)− C(δ, α) + 1)τj1 + C(δ, α)F
,
s.t.
V∑
j=1
τj ≤ 1.
(44)
Problem 8 is a typical water-filling optimization problem.
By relying on the classic Lagrangian multiplier, we arrive at
the optimal solution as
τˆv =
( √qv
η − C(δ, α)F
A(δ, α)− C(δ, α) + 1
)+
, ∀v, (45)
where we have η =
∑v¯
j=1
√
qj
v¯C(δ,α)F+A(δ,α)−C(δ,α)+1 , and v¯ satisfies
the constraint of τˆv > 0.
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C. Comparisons
Let us now compare the optimal SBS allocation variable τv
in the context of the above two schemes. First, we investigate
τ?v in the uniform pricing scheme. By substituting Eq. (38)
into Eq. (35), we have
τ?v =
(√
ΓvΛsbh
Θ2λ
√
1
s?v
− Λ
Θ
)+
=

√
qv
η′ −C(δ,α)F
A(δ,α)−C(δ,α)+1 , v = 1, · · · , uˆ
0, v = uˆ+ 1, · · · , V,
(46)
where η′ =
∑uˆ
j=1
√
qj
uˆC(δ,α)F+A(δ,α)−C(δ,α)+1 , and uˆ ensures τ
?
v > 0.
Then, comparing τ?v given in Eq. (46) to the optimal solution
τˆ of the global optimization scheme given by Eq. (45), we can
see that these two solutions are the same. In other words,
the uniform pricing scheme in fact represents the global
optimization scheme in terms of maximizing the sum profit
SGLB and maximizing the back-haul cost reduction SBH .
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide both numerical as well as Monte-
Carlo simulation results for evaluating the performance of
the proposed schemes. The physical layer parameters of our
simulations, such as the path-loss exponent α, transmit power
P of the SBSs and the noise power σ2 are similar to those
of the 3GPP standards. The unit of noise power and transmit
power is Watt, while the SBS and MU intensities are expressed
in terms of the numbers of the nodes per square kilometer.
Explicitly, we set the path-loss exponent to α = 4, the SBS
transmit power to P = 2 Watt, the noise power to σ2 =
10−10 Watt, and the pre-set SINR threshold to δ = 0.01. For
the file caching system, we set the number of files in F to
N = 500 and set the number of VRs to V = 15. For the
network deployments, we set the intensity of the MUs to ζ =
50/km2, and investigate three cases of the SBS deployments
as λ = 10/km2, 20/km2 and 30/km2.
For the pricing system, the profit/UAP is considered to
be the profit gained per month within an area of one square
kilometer, i.e., /month · km2. We note that the profits gained
by the NSP and by the VRs are proportional to the cost sbh
of back-haul channels for transmitting a video. Hence, without
loss of generality, we set sbh = 1 for simplicity. Additionally,
we set K = 10/month, which is the average number of video
requests from an MU per month.
We first verify our derivation of Pr(Ev,f ) by comparing the
analytical results of Theorem 1 to the Monte-Carlo simulation
results. Upon verifying Pr(Ev,f ), we will investigate the
optimization results within the framework of the proposed
Stackelberg game by providing numerical results.
A. Performance Evaluation on Pr(Ev,f )
For the Monte-Carlo simulations of this subsection, all the
average performances are evaluated over a thousand network
scenarios, where the distributions of the SBSs and the MUs
change from case to case according the PPPs characterized by
Φ and Ψ, respectively.
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Fig. 2. Comparisons between the simulations and analytical results on
Pr(Ev,f ). We consider four kinds of storage size Q in each SBS, i.e.,
Q = 10, 50, 100, 500, and three kinds of SBS intensity, i.e., λ = 10, 20, 30.
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Fig. 3. The minimum number of Q that allows all the VRs to participate in
the game under different preference parameter γ. In the case that the minimum
Q is larger than N , it means that some VRs will be inevitable excluded from
the game.
Note that Pr(Ev,f ) in Theorem 1 is the probability that an
MU can obtain its requested video directly from the memory
of an SBS rented by Vv . We can see from the expression of
Pr(Ev,f ) in Eq. (7) that it is a function of the fraction τv
of the SBSs that are rented by Vv . Although τv should be
optimized according to the price charged by the NSP, here
we investigate a variety of τv values, varying from 0 to 1, to
verify the derivation of Pr(Ev,f ).
Fig. 2 shows our comparisons between the simulations
and analytical results on Pr(Ev,f ). We consider four different
storage sizes Q in each SBS by setting Q = 10, 50, 100, 500.
Correspondingly, we have four values for the number of file
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the preference parameter γ, under the two schemes. We also consider four
different values of the storage size Q, i.e., 10, 50, 100, 500.
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parameter γ, under the two schemes.
groups, i.e., F = 50, 10, 5, 1. Furthermore, we consider the
SBS intensities of λ = 10, 20, 30. From Fig. 2, we can
see that the simulations results closely match the analytical
results derived in Theorem 1. Our simulations show that the
intensity λ does not affect Pr(Ev,f ), which is consistent with
our analytical results. Furthermore, a larger Q leads to a higher
value of Pr(Ev,f ). Hence, enlarging the storage size is helpful
for achieving a higher probability of direct downloading.
B. Impact of the VR Preference Parameter γ
The preference distribution q of the VRs defined in Eq. (5)
is an important factor in predetermining the system perfor-
mance. Indeed, we can see from Eq. (5) that this distribution
depends on the parameter γ. Generally, we have 0 < γ ≤ 1,
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Fig. 6. Number of participants vs. the storage size Q, under the two schemes.
We also consider two different values of γ, i.e., γ = 0.3, 1.
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Fig. 7. Various revenues, including SNSP and SGLB , vs. the storage size
Q, under the two schemes.
with a larger γ representing a more uneven popularity among
the VRs. First, we find the minimum Q that can keep all
the VRs in the game. This minimum Q for the non-uniform
pricing scheme (NUPS) is given by Eq. (25), while the
minimum Q for the uniform-pricing scheme (UPS) is given by
Eq. (37). From the two equations, this minimum Q increases
exponentially with γ/3 in the NUPS, while it also increases
exponentially with a higher exponent of γ/2 in the UPS.
Fig. 3 shows this minimum Q for different values of the VR
preference parameter γ.
We can see that the UPS needs a larger Q than the NUPS
for keeping all the VRs. This gap increases rapidly with the
growth of γ. For example, for γ = 0.3, the uniform pricing
scheme requires almost 80 more storages, while for γ = 0.6,
it needs 200 more. We can also observe in Fig. 3 that for
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Fig. 8. Price charged on each VR for renting an SBS per month.
γ > 0.66 in the UPS and for γ > 0.98 in the NUPS, the
minimum Q becomes larger than the overall number of videos
N . In both cases, since we have Q ≤ N (Q > N results in
the same performance as Q = N ), some unpopular VRs will
be excluded from the game.
Next, we study the number of VR participants that stay
in the game for the two schemes upon increasing γ. We
can see from Fig. 4 that the number of VR participants
keeps going down upon increasing γ in the both schemes.
The NUPS always keeps more VRs in the game than the
UPS under the same γ. At the same time, by considering
Q = 10, 50, 100, 500, it is shown that for a given γ, a higher
Q will keep more VRs in the game.
Fig. 5 shows two kinds of revenues gained by the two
schemes for a given storage of Q = 500, namely, the global
profit SGLB defined in Eq. (43) and the profit of the NSP
SNSP defined in Eq. (9). Recall that we have SGLB = 2SBH
according to Eq. (43). We can see that the revenues of both
schemes increase exponentially upon increasing γ, as stated
in Remark 4. As our analytical result shows, the profit SNSP
gained by the NUPS is optimal and thus it is higher than that
gained by the UPS, while the UPS maximizes both SGLB and
SBH . Fig. 5 verifies the accuracy of our derivations.
C. Impact of the Storage Size Q
Since γ is a network parameter that is relatively fixed, the
NSP can adapt the storage size Q for controlling its perfor-
mance. In this subsection, we investigate the performance as
a function of Q. Fig. 6 shows the number of participants in
the game versus Q, where γ = 0.3 and 1 are considered. It is
shown that for a larger Q, more VRs are able to participate
in the game. Again, the NUPS outperforms the UPS owing to
its capability of accommodating more VRs for a given Q. By
comparing the scenarios of γ = 0.3 and 1, we find that for
γ = 0.3, a given increase of Q can accommodate more VRs
in the game than γ = 1.
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Fig. 9. The fraction of SBSs that are rented by each VR.
Fig. 7 shows both SNSP and SGLB versus Q for the two
schemes for a given γ = 1. We can see that the revenues of
both schemes increase with the growth of Q. It is shown that
the profit SNSP gained by the NUPS is higher than the one
gained by the UPS, while the UPS outperforms the NUPS in
terms of both SGLB and SBH .
D. Individual VR Performance
In this subsection, we investigate the performance of each
individual VR, including the price charged to them for renting
an SBS per month, and the fractions of the SBSs they rent from
the NSP. We fix γ = 0.5 and choose a large storage size of
Q = 500 for ensuring that all the VRs can be included. Fig. 8
shows the price charged to each VR for renting an SBS. The
VRs are arranged according to their popularity order, ranging
from V1 to V15, with V1 having the highest popularity and V15
the lowest one. We can see from the figure that in the NUPS,
the price for renting an SBS is higher for the VRs having
a higher popularity than those with a lower popularity. By
contrast, in the UPS, this price is fixed for all the VRs. Fig. 9
shows the specific fraction of the rented SBSs at each VR. In
both schemes, the VRs associated with a high popularity tend
to rent more SBSs. The UPS in fact represents an instance of
the water-filling algorithm. Furthermore, the UPS seems more
aggressive than the NUPS, since the less popular VRs of the
UPS are more difficult to rent an SBS, and thus these VRs are
likely to be excluded from the game with a higher probability.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered a commercial small-cell
caching system consisting of an NSP and multiple VRs, where
the NSP leases its SBSs to the VRs for gaining profits and for
reducing the costs of back-haul channel transmissions, while
the VRs, after storing popular videos to the rented SBSs, can
provide faster transmissions to the MUs, hence gaining more
profits. We proposed a Stackelberg game theoretic framework
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by viewing the SBSs as a type of resources. We first modeled
the MUs and SBSs using two independent PPPs with the aid of
stochastic geometry, and developed the probability expression
of direct downloading. Then, based on the probability derived,
we formulated a Stackelberg game for maximizing the average
profit of the NSP as well as individual VRs. Next, we investi-
gate the Stackelberg equilibrium by solving the associated non-
convex optimization problem. We considered a non-uniform
pricing scheme and an uniform pricing scheme. In the former
scheme, the prices charged to each VR for renting an SBS
are different, while the latter imposes the same price for
each VR. We proved that the non-uniform pricing scheme
can effectively maximize the profit of the NSP, while the
uniform one maximizes the sum profit of the NSP and the VRs.
Furthermore, we derived a relationship between the optimal
pricing of renting an SBS, the fraction of SBSs rented by each
VR, the storage size of each SBS and the popularity of the
VRs. We verified by Monte-Carlo simulations that the direct
downloading probability under our PPP model is consistent
with our derived results. Then we provided several numerical
results for showing that the proposed schemes are effective in
both pricing and SBSs allocation.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Recall that the SBSs allocated to the VR Vv and cache Gf
are modeled as a “thinned” HPPP Φv,f having the intensity of
1
F τvλ. We consider a typical MU M who wishes to connect
to the nearest SBS B in Φv,f . The event Ev,f represents that
this SBS can support M with an SINR no lower than δ, and
thus M can obtain the desired file from the cache of B.
We carry out the analysis on Pr(Ev,f ) for the typical MU
M located at the origin. Since the network is interference
dominant, we neglect the noise in the following. We denote
by z the distance between M and B, by xZ the location of
B, and by ρ(xZ) the received SINR at M from B. Then the
average probability that M can download the desired video
from B is
Pr(ρ(xZ) ≥ δ)
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr
 hxZz−α∑
x∈Φ\{xZ}
hx ‖x‖−α
≥ δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ z
 fZ (z) dz
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr
hxZ ≥
δ
( ∑
x∈Φ\{xZ}
hx ‖x‖−α
)
z−α
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
z

2pi
1
F
τvλz exp
(
−pi 1
F
τvλz
2
)
dz (47)
=
∫ ∞
0
EI (exp (−zαδI)) 2pi 1
F
τvλz exp
(
−pi 1
F
τvλz
2
)
dz,
where we have I ,
∑
x∈Φ\{xZ}
hx ‖x‖−α, and the PDF of
z, i.e., fZ (z), is derived by the null probability of the HPPP
Φv,f with the intensity of 1F τvλ. More specifically in Φv,f ,
since the number of the SBSs k in an area of A follows the
Poisson distribution, the probability of the event that there is
no SBS in the area with the radius of z can be calculated
as [17]
Pr(k = 0 | A = piz2) = e−A 1F τvλ (A
1
F τvλ)
k
k!
= e−piz
2 1
F τvλ.
(48)
By using the above expression, we arrive at fZ(z) =
2pi 1F τvλz exp
(−pi 1F τvλz2). Note that the interference I con-
sists of I1 and I2, where I1 emanates from the SBSs in Φ
excluding Φv,f , while I2 is from the SBSs in Φv,f excluding
B. The SBSs contributing to I1, denoted by Φv,f , have the
intensity of
(
1− 1F τv
)
λ, while those contributing to I2 have
the intensity of 1F τvλ.
Correspondingly, the calculation of EI (exp (−zαδI)) will
be split into the product of two expectations over I1 and I2.
The expectation over I1 is calculated as
EI1 (exp (−zαδI1))
(a)
= EΦv,f
( ∏
x∈Φv
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−zαδhx ‖x‖−α
)
exp(−hx)dhx
)
(b)
= exp
(
−
(
1− 1
F
τv
)
λ
∫
R2
(
1− 1
1 + zαδ ‖xk‖−α
)
dxk
)
= exp
(
−2pi
(
1− 1
F
τv
)
λ
1
α
z2δ
2
αB
(
2
α
, 1− 2
α
))
,
= exp
(
−pi
(
1− 1
F
τv
)
λC(δ, α)z2
)
, (49)
where (a) is based on the independence of chan-
nel fading, while (b) follows from E
(∏
x
u (x)
)
=
exp
(−λ ∫R2 (1− u (x)) dx), where x ∈ Φ and Φ is an PPP
in R2 with the intensity λ [24], and C(δ, α) has been defined
as 2αδ
2
αB
(
2
α , 1− 2α
)
.
The expectation over I2 has to take into account z as the
distance from the nearest interfering SBS. Then we have
EI2 (exp(−zαδI2))
= exp
(
− 1
F
τvλ2pi
∫ ∞
z
(
1− 1
1 + zαδr−α
)
rdr
)
(a)
= exp
(
− 1
F
τvλpiδ
2
α z2
2
α
∫ ∞
δ−1
κ
2
α−1
1 + κ
dx
)
(50)
(b)
= exp
(
− 1
F
τvλpiδz
2 2
α− 2 2F1
(
1, 1− 2
α
; 2− 2
α
;−δ
))
,
where (a) defines κ , δ−1z−αrα, and 2F1(·) in (b)
is the hypergeometric function. As we defined A(δ, α) =
2δ
α−2 2F1
(
1, 1− 2α ; 2− 2α ;−δ
)
, by substituting (49) and (50)
into (47), we have
Pr(ρ(xZ) ≥ δ) =
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−pi
(
1− 1
F
τv
)
λC(δ, α)z2
)
exp
(
−pi 1
F
τvλz
2A(δ, α)
)
2pi
1
F
τvλz exp
(
−pi 1
F
τvλz
2
)
dz
=
1
F τv
C(δ, α)(1− 1F τv) +A(δ, α) 1F τv + 1F τv
. (51)
This completes the proof. 
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
By applying Lagrangian multipliers to the objective func-
tion, we have
L(s, µ,ν) =
V∑
j=1
sj + µ
 V∑
j=1
√
Γj
sj
− (V Λ + Θ)
√
λ
Λsbh
− V∑
j=1
νjsj ,
(52)
where µ and νj are non-negative multipliers associated with
the constraints
∑V
j=1
√
Γj
sj
−(V Λ+Θ)
√
λ
Λsbh
≤ 0 and sj ≥ 0,
respectively. Then the KKT conditions can be written as
∂L(s, µ,ν)
∂sj
= 0, ∀j = 1, · · · , V,
µ
 V∑
j=1
√
Γj
sj
− (V Λ + Θ)
√
λ
Λsbh
 = 0, and νjsj = 0, ∀j.
(53)
From the first line of Eq. (53), we have
sj =
3
√
µ2Γj
4(1− νj)2 . (54)
Obviously, we have sj 6= 0, ∀j, otherwise the constraint∑V
j=1
√
Γj
sj
− (V Λ + Θ)
√
λ
Λsbh
≤ 0 cannot be satisfied.
Thus, we have νj = 0, ∀j. Furthermore, we have µ 6= 0
according to Eq. (54) since sj is non-zero. This means that∑V
j=1
√
Γj
sj
− (V Λ + Θ)
√
λ
Λsbh
= 0.
By substituting Eq. (54) into this constraint, we have
3
√
µ =
√
Λsbh
∑V
j=1
3
√
2Γj√
λ(V Λ + Θ)
. (55)
Then it follows that
sj =
Λsbh
(∑V
v=1
3
√
Γv
)2
3
√
Γj
λ(V Λ + Θ)2
. (56)
This completes the proof. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
As discussed in Eq. (23) and Eq. (24), we have proved that
Q >
NC(δ,α)
(∑V
j=1
3
√
qj
qV
−V
)
A(δ,α)−C(δ,α)+1 is a sufficient condition for the
optimal solution in Eq. (22). In other words, as long as Q is
satisfied, we have the conclusion that the solution in Eq. (22)
is optimal and ξv = 1, ∀v.
Next, we prove the necessary aspect. Without loss of
generality, we assume that
NC(δ, α)
(∑V−1
j=1
3
√
qj
qV−1
− V + 1
)
A(δ, α)− C(δ, α) + 1 < Q ≤
NC(δ, α)
(∑V
j=1
3
√
qj
qV
− V
)
A(δ, α)− C(δ, α) + 1 . (57)
This leads to sV ≥ ΓvsbhΛλ , and the VR VV will be excluded
from the game. In this case, we have ξj = 1, j = 1, · · · , V −1,
and Problem 4 will be rewritten as follows.
Problem 9: We rewrite Problem 4 as
min
s0
V−1∑
j=1
sj ,
s.t.
V−1∑
j=1
√
Γj
sj
≤ ((V − 1)Λ + Θ)
√
λ
Λsbh
.
(58)
Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, and combined with the
constraint of Q in Eq. (57), the optimal solution of Problem 9
is given by
sˆv =
Λs
bh(
∑V−1
j=1
3
√
Γj)
2 3
√
Γv
λ((V−1)Λ+Θ)2 , v = 1, · · · , V − 1,
∞, v = V.
(59)
We can see that the optimal solution given in Eq. (59)
contradicts to the optimal solution of Problem 4 given in
Eq. (22). Hence, Q >
NC(δ,α)
(∑V
j=1
3
√
qj
qV
−V
)
A(δ,α)−C(δ,α)+1 is a necessary
condition for finding the optimal solution in Eq. (22). This
completes the proof. 
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Consider v1, v2 = 1, · · · , V and v1 = v2+1. Then we prove
that Uv1 > Uv2 . We have
Uv1 =
NC(δ, α)
(∑v1
j=1
3
√
qj
qv1
− v1
)
A(δ, α)− C(δ, α) + 1 =
NC(δ, α)
(∑v2
j=1
3
√
qj
qv1
− v2 +
∑v1
j=v2+1
3
√
qj
qv1
− (v1 − v2)
)
A(δ, α)− C(δ, α) + 1
=
NC(δ, α)
(∑v2
j=1
3
√
qj
qv1
− v2
)
A(δ, α)− C(δ, α) + 1
(a)
>
NC(δ, α)
(∑v2
j=1
3
√
qj
qv2
− v2
)
A(δ, α)− C(δ, α) + 1 = Uv2 ,
(60)
where (a) comes from the fact that qv1 < qv2 . This completes
the proof. 
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
It is plausible that if L can only keep at most v VRs, it has
to retain the v most popular VRs to maximize its profit. Let
us now prove that if L keeps (v+w) VRs, w = 1, · · · , V −v,
in the game, it cannot achieve the optimal solution for Uv <
Q ≤ Uv+1.
Problem 10: In the case that L keeps (v+w) VRs, we have
the optimization problem of
min
s0
v+w∑
j=1
sj ,
s.t.
v+w∑
j=1
√
Γj
sj
≤ ((v + w)Λ + Θ)
√
λ
Λsbh
.
(61)
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Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we obtain that Q >
NC(δ,α)
(∑v+w
j=1
3
√
qj
qv+w
−(v+w)
)
A(δ,α)−C(δ,α)+1 = Uv+w is the necessary
condition for the (v + w) VRs to participate in the game.
This contradicts to the premise Uv < Q ≤ Uv+1, since we
have Q > Uv+1 according to Lemma 3. Let us now consider
the cases of w′ = 0,−1, · · · , 1 − v. To ensure there are
(v + w′) VRs in the game, Q has to satisfy the condition
that Q > Uv+w′ . Since Q > Uv ≥ Uv+w′ , this implies that
given (v + w′) VRs in the game, the NSP can achieve an
optimal solution. This completes the proof. 
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